




Combat Maneuver Training Center

News from the "Box"



JUL - SEP 02

Issue 3

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DISCLAIMER

This CMTC publication is not a doctrinal product and is not intended to serve as a program to guide the conduct of operations and training. The information and lessons herein are the perceptions of those individuals involved in military exercises, activities, and real-world events. Our intent is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner.

News From The Box is prepared by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), CMTC Detachment. For additional information contact CPT Mike Sennett or Mr. Dan Reinick, DSN 466-2323, or email: michael.sennett@cmtdc.7atc.army.mil; danny.reinick@cmtdc.7atc.army.mil.

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FOREWORD

The Combat Maneuver Training Center's "News from the Box" is designed as a direct communications channel between CMTC and our USAREUR based commanders and warfighters.

My intent is for this document to provide a candid and open forum that provides our USAREUR training audience ground-truth observations from our CMTC Observer Controllers. Service as an OC is arguably one of the most professionally rewarding jobs any of us will ever have. OCs are provided the opportunity to build upon their operational experience by observing our Army's best and brightest during numerous rotations, executing repetitive missions, throughout the training year. Their firsthand experience, privileged observation of training units, and understanding of doctrine combine to make our OCs one of the best sources of information on TTPs that work and insights into potential solutions to reverse negative training trends. The following articles were written with that goal in mind.

The Combat Maneuver Training Center and the Contemporary Operational Environment in 2002. As identified in recent operations in the United States, Afghanistan and the Philippines, as well as continued operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, the US military is conducting a wide range of missions. Following the CSA's guidance to the CTCs on implementing elements of the COE, CMTC continues to challenge USAREUR soldiers with rotations that range from high-intensity conflict (HIC) to stability and support operations (SASO) with complex battlefield incidents (CBIs) to provide the full spectrum of challenges facing today's deploying soldier.

Tactical Standing Operating Procedures for Contingency Operations. This article presents the issues associated with the utilization of tactical standing operating procedures (TSOPs) in contingency operations. It describes a model of a TSOP card system, which was proofed during Stabilization Force (SFOR) 9, Operation Joint Forge, Task Force Eagle, Bosnia. This TSOP card system could be adapted force-wide for use at multiple echelons in different operating environments.

I strongly urge leaders to take a few minutes to read these articles and relate the lessons in them to your soldiers. Use the knowledge and experience of others to concentrate your limited training resources on unit weaknesses you recognize from these articles. Your goal is combat readiness. CMTC's mission is to help you attain that goal.

Train to win!

**H. Mike Davis
COL, AR
Commanding**

The Combat Maneuver Training Center and the Contemporary Operational Environment in 2002

By MAJ Kreg E. Schnell
Former CMTC Observer Controller and OPS GP S2

INTRODUCTION

Two years ago, CMTC produced an initial article¹ explaining the Combat Maneuver Training Center's (CMTC) initiatives for meeting the Chief of Staff of the Army's (CSA) intent for future training of the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). This article explains what CMTC has done to refine this effort since the publication of our first article, and why it is so important for the future success of our forces. It also highlights where we continue to move forward as the COE develops in the United States Army Europe (USAREUR).

As identified in recent operations in the United States, Afghanistan and the Philippines, as well as continued operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, the US military is conducting a wide range of missions. Far wider than the Cold War missions most of us grew up with where we trained for strategic deterrence, counter-offensive maneuvers with heavy force reinforcements from the US, and the defeat of the Red hordes we expected to flood through the Fulda Gap in central Germany.

Now we are involved in homeland defense, security operations, military force training missions, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, nation building and humanitarian assistance. All would agree, however, that our focus must remain fighting and winning the nation's wars.

WHERE WE STARTED

The previous article cited above discussed some of the characteristics of future military operations as outlined in the April 2000 *TRADOC White Paper*² and how these were the foundations of our scenario development at CMTC. These characteristics are:

Ambiguity – *The future enemy's attempt to stay below the threshold of clear aggression and be politically and psychologically astute.*

Rapidity – *The global trend towards the compression of time, and the adaptation and mutation facilitated by continued communications and interconnectivity improvements.*

Asymmetry – *The enemy's ability to exploit our weaknesses, even when we have more and better conventional capabilities.*

Force Protection – *An essential element of total combat power; the efforts to protect the force's fighting potential.*

¹ <http://call.army.mil/products/nftf/janfeb01/warren.htm>

² <http://www.cgsc.army.mil/djco/core/c500/ay2002/lsn02/foe.doc>

At the time the last article was written we were also just beginning to integrate the other seven characteristics mentioned in the *TRADOC White Paper*:

1. **Operations on complex/urbanized terrain.** *Future adversaries will focus on urban areas (or complex terrain) to negate technological overmatches in intelligence and weapon systems U.S. forces will employ.*
2. **Information warfare/information operations.** *Information superiority -- the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same -- will be the lynchpin of all Army operations across all mission areas.*
3. **Need to avoid phased deployments, to form force packages, and to deal with force caps.** *Political restrictions will dictate both the size and composition of the forces deployed.*
4. **Complex relationships.** *Economic interdependence and political interactions require the Army to coordinate and work with allies, non-governmental organizations, and other governmental agencies/services during the conduct of operations.*
5. **Rules of Engagement (ROE).** *U.S. forces will operate under restrictions in both maneuver and application of firepower.*
6. **Media.** *Media coverage of operations and the real-time dissemination of information will also dramatically affect international relations and strategic interaction.*
7. **Constrained resources.** *The Army will continue to operate with limited resources of time, personnel, and equipment.*

We used these characteristics and developed rotation plans to stress the planning and preparations of brigade and battalion staffs and soldiers as they attempted to execute missions in an asymmetric environment; units could encounter enemy conventional mounted forces or sympathetic militiamen, or irate civilians and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Of course, these continue to be the foundation of scenario and rotation building. Later in the article, we'll discuss how well these characteristics are integrated into today's rotational scenarios.

Following the CSA's guidance to the CTCs on implementing elements of the COE, we developed rotations that challenged USAREUR soldiers with as many of the obstacles and challenges we thought they could face in real conflict. There was an extensive effort to reshape the mix of high-intensity conflict (HIC) and stability and support operations (SASO) with complex battlefield incidents (CBIs) to provide the full spectrum of challenges facing today's deploying soldier.

In earlier years, we still used what some remember as the "Danubia Handbook". Danubia was our fictional land that fell into a civil war in 1991. At the end of that war, there were three distinct countries based along ethnic lines: Juraland, Vilslakia and Sowenia. At times, the border between Sowenia and Vilslakia ran down the center of the Hohenfels Training Area (HTA) and at times, it ran down the western or eastern boundary. In effect, the scenario changed nearly every rotation, and was often confusing for the scenario writers, the staff and the training unit. It gave the opposing forces

(OPFOR) no real purpose other than to go out and fight blue forces (BLUEFOR). It also hindered the unit's ability to build on their experiences and databases from one rotation to another.




Figure 1


WHAT WE'VE DONE

Since our focus is on combined arms in the mid to high intensity environment, force-on-force battles and battlefield operating system (BOS) synchronization in a HIC environment, we believe that our OPFOR must be on par with the BLUEFOR for training. Although our OPFOR is still moving to the transition phase, we did identify that our OPFOR needed to be highly adaptive as well as independent. Figure 1 shows where the CMTC scenario lies along the conflict continuum. For most scenarios, the CMTC OPFOR is still a regional power and can often have either superior numbers or a superior quality of force.

In 2001, we lifted many of the previous restrictions placed on the OPFOR. We stopped tying them to the Soviet/Russian models of: "combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP) 1-3 kilometers (km) in front of the forward patrol (FP), followed 3-5 kms by the forward security element (FSE), followed 5-10 kms by the advance guard main body (AGMB)"; or "Division recon will enter between 1700-2200, followed the next morning by independent/engineer reconnaissance patrols (IRPs/ERPs) from 0800-1200, followed by regimental recon from 1800-2400, followed by battalion scouts at H -2 hours"; or that "they will always attack 2 up and 1 back or 1 up and 2 back." The OPFOR staff follows the military decision making process just like every other battalion in the Army, and based on the systems, manpower, equipment, and missions they are given, they formulate a plan. They may defend forward once and back the next time. They may have AT-5 systems forward to maximize the thermal capability, or they may use them in the traditional reserve role. They may use all their infantry to infiltrate or they may ride in the BMPs. Given the constraints and limitations of the operations order given to them, they must determine the best methods to accomplish the tasks assigned.

About this same time, with the support of the brigade intelligence trainer, CMTC began the process of rebuilding and updating the scenario to help us meet our goal of creating a more authentic contemporary operating environment.

We needed to give reasons for an enemy militia to exist, we needed to give them strategic goals and objectives, and we needed to give them a formal structure. We needed to create a way to inject special operations forces into the scenario when they would be required to facilitate training objectives. We needed to figure out how to cause a fight from either the east or the west (since training units often switch directions from rotation to rotation) without having to rewrite the entire history of the region.



The majority of people living in this area are ethnic Vilslakians, although they hold almost none of the traditional governmental or business power positions. This unequal ethnic mix, as in our former, similar scenario, gives us the framework to inject militia, information operations (IO) and the media, humanitarian assistance, and coordination with NGOs. Soldiers and leaders must deal with refugees and displaced persons (DPs) that may have their hearts won-over, or not. These refugees and DPs may have valuable information that the training unit can use, if they can successfully “win the hearts and minds.” If they fail to treat the civilians on the battlefield (COBs) with dignity and respect, they may find hostile crowds surrounding their command and control (C²) nodes.

CMTC Scenario
(OPFOR Fights E to W Rotation)




Figure 3

CMTC Scenario
(OPFOR Fights W to E Rotation)




Figure 4

Early in 2002, we continued to build on the previous year's work by giving the Republic of Vilslakia (ROV) a national strategy with national goals and objectives (see Figure 5), much like those found in *FM 7-100.0, Opposing Forces Doctrinal Framework and Strategy*³. The ROV strives to be the regional power; this is one of the national strategic goals we attributed to them. Based on *FM 7-100.0*, we developed a strategic campaign plan (SCP) for the ROV to defeat their biggest regional rival, Kolokia. They also intend to take over the CASV because of the economic value of the area. They need to control the lines of communications (LOCs) along the Donau River in order to have access to the North and Black Seas. For this, we developed SCP 2, the Annexation of the Disputed Territories. However, the resources of Vilslakia are not unlimited and they must choose to execute one SCP or the other.



Figure 5

Through the effective use of information warfare, the ROV ignited the fire of unrest, fueled by the theme of protecting their oppressed ethnic brothers in the more prosperous CASV, and initially began a guerilla war. Well executed guerilla warfare and masterly use of the international media set the stage that the Republic of Sowenia (ROS) cannot reasonably protect ethnic Vilslakians and the ROV

³ <http://www-leav.army.mil/threats/index/>

decides they can invade and quickly defeat the Sovenians. They believe they can defeat the ROS before US forces deploy or prevent their deployment; if the US forces deploy, the ROS hopes to cause enough US casualties early on with terrorist acts so that waning US public opinion will force an early withdrawal of US forces.

We developed an order of battle (see Figure 6) and force structure (see Figure 7) for the Vilslakian Militia (VM). The VM has an urban branch and a rural branch. The urban branch is configured in a “cell structure,” with an intelligence cell, a communications cell, a support cell, transportation cell and a direct action cell (terrorists) much like the Irish Republican Army and the al-Qaïda. The urban VM wear civilian clothes and carry no weapons, except for the occasional suicide bomber. The role players are often a mix of professional, permanent-party COBs, augmentees from the OPFOR battalion, and hired local nationals with fluency in various languages. They all live and work in the villages during the rotation.

The rural VM are OPFOR soldiers wearing various combinations of uniforms and civilian clothes and carrying various weapons/systems. They come to the villages only when necessary. They live and work in the wooded hills and valleys nearby the villages. The rural VM soldiers are trained by the Vilslakian Special Operations Forces (VSOF) to conduct reconnaissance, direct action ambushes, and raids on tactical operations centers (TOCs) and logistics caches. There was a conscious decision to have less VSOF play. Special purpose forces (SPF) are very expensive in terms of money and time to train, and should be used sparingly. For this reason, we choose not to use them in a tactical role. The targets SPF would go after would ordinarily be strategic in nature. In the missions given to the OPFOR, we limit the VSOF targets to Q-36 Firefinder radars and the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS).

VM and VSOF Operations




Figure 6

VM Force Structure




Figure 7

There is a reason the ROV has two strategic campaign plans. According to the scenario, the US has been watching the saber rattling of the ROV for some time. Because of limited resources, we know the ROV cannot execute both SCPs simultaneously. The key to which SCP they will execute is the movement of the 4th Operational-Strategic Command (OSC) (Refer to the 4th OSC Order of Battle at Figure 8). If the 4th OSC moves north, the US and its allies know they are executing SCP 1 and attempting to defeat Kolokia. If the 4th OSC moves west, we know they are executing SCP 2, the Annexation of the Disputed Territories.




Figure 8

Spelled out in the *Road to War* packet sent to the training brigade prior to their arrival at CMTC, is the fact that US national surveillance systems picked up the westward movement of the 4th OSC, meaning the ROV has chosen to execute SPC 2. The training brigade is alerted and deployed to destroy attacking VNA forces and restore the ROS territorial integrity and regional stability.

Most of us saw them as students at various officer and non-commissioned officer courses and we struggled with them for years: “COFMs” (Correlation of Forces Matrices). In the field, many unit leaders called it “battlefield calculus” or even “beer math”, but the basic concept is the same: “the OPFOR has this much stuff to kill me with, so I need to have this much stuff (including help from higher headquarters or better use of combat multipliers) to make the numbers come out in my favor.” We had to justify the numbers of T-80s and BMPs we were giving the OPFOR. Initially, we took the figures provided by the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Ft. Leavenworth, KS⁴. PhDs and lab technicians at places like Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD originally developed these figures. They took actual weapons and vehicles and fired various weapons at them and calculated the outcomes to determine what could kill what and what could survive what. An example is given below in Figure 9:

⁴ <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/ctac/refpubs/ST100-3/TOCC.htm>


Friendly		Enemy	
Type	Combat Potential	Type	Combat Potential
M 2	250	BMP 2	250
M 1A1	925	T-80	900
BSFV	175	AT-5	275
AH-64 APACHE	900	2S6	200
AH-64D LONGBOW	950	HIND-E	600
JAVELIN	200	2S1	220
M109A6 SP HOW (155)	250	2S19	250
MLRS	550	2S5	317
OH-58D	300	BM21	550
<i>Dismounted Troops</i>	10	<i>Dismounted Troops</i>	10

Figure 9

Our doctrine tells us that we should have three times as much combat power than a defending enemy in order to attack and have at least a 50% chance of success⁵. Using various tactics, one can increase that 3:1 ratio and increase the chances of success. We started with the basic numbers above and with the basic 3:1, 1:3 and 1:1 models for attack, defend and movement to contact, respectively. We plugged in the numbers that BLUEFOR brought to the battlefield, arrived at a figure and then worked out the numbers of T-80s, BMPs and AT-5s the OPFOR would be allotted to conduct the counter mission. This meant that a tank-heavy BLUEFOR task force would face more OPFOR vehicles than a mech-heavy task force. Operations Group personnel and the OPFOR's operations officer work out the individual numbers based on maintenance status and unit integrity. Of course, these values are based on a "flat earth", and the calculations done were in a laboratory environment reflecting neither whether the enemy has a prepared or hasty defense, nor whether they defend in open desert or rough, wooded terrain.

While planning what we consider our first COE exercise, we received some guidance from the Commander of the Operations Group (COG). We were directed to find a better way to calculate combat power for the OPFOR. We began working with the Threat Support Directorate (TSD) from TRADOC, DCSINT (the proponent for the COE) to re-look the combat power we give the OPFOR. One of our rotation planners found a relative combat power analysis calculator initially developed by several School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) students at the US Army's Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Ft. Leavenworth, KS. The Marine Air-Ground Task Force Staff Training Program, the Marine Corps' version of CGSC, further defined their concept of relative combat power analysis (see Figure 10).

⁵ <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/ctac/refpubs/ST100-3/c8/8Chp.htm>



6

Figure 10

We wanted something that accounted for more of the five elements of combat power⁷ and this calculator is very effective.

⁶ http://www.mstp.quantico.usmc.mil/publications/pamphlets/Pamphlet5_0_6/MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.6.pdf

⁷ http://www.cgsc.army.mil/cdd/FM3-0/3-0html/hChap_04.htm - Elements

Posture	Deliberate Attack	1.50	Posture	Prepared Defense	1.50
Terrain		1.00	Terrain	Rolling gentle, mixed	1.50
Day/Night	Day	1.00	Day/Night	Day	1.00
CEV		1.00	CEV		1.00

POSTURE - Applied to both sides.			TERRAIN - Applied to DEFENDER only.		
1	Fortified Defense	1.6	1	Rugged, heavily wooded	1.5
2	Prepared Defense	1.5	2	Rugged, mixed (extra-rugged, bare)	1.55
3	Hasty Defense	1.3	3	Rugged, bare	1.45
4	Delay	1.2	4	Rolling foothills, heavily wooded	1.35
5	Withdrawal	1.15	5	Rolling foothills, mixed	1.45
6	Hasty Attack	1	6	Rolling foothills, bare	1.3
7	Deliberate Attack	1.3	7	Rolling gentle, heavily wooded	1.2
			8	Rolling gentle, mixed	1.3
			9	Rolling gentle, bare	1.2
			10	Flat, heavily wooded	1.1
			11	Flat, mixed	1.2
			12	Flat, bare, hard	1.05
			13	Flat, desert	1.15
			14	Rolling dunes	1.4
			15	Swamp, jungle	1.4
			16	Swamp, mixed, wet open	1.3
			17	Urban	1.4
			18	-	1

LIGHT Cond - Applied to both sides.		
	Light Conditions	
1	Day	1
2	Blue Night	0.9
3	Red Night	0.8
4	-	1

CEV (Combat Effectiveness Value) – Only applied when quality of units is drastically different.		
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Figure 11

Starting with the systems BLUEFOR brings to the battlefield, this calculator takes into account the effects of terrain, and whether a defender is in a hasty or fortified defense (see Figure 11). It also factors in whether the operation is going to take place during daylight or during hours of limited visibility. Operations Group planners and the OPFOR come to agreement on what type of terrain makes up the majority of terrain for a specific mission and the remainder falls into place based upon when the mission will take place (day or night) and what type mission it is (attack, defend, movement to contact).

One element that this calculator accounts for is combat effectiveness value, a sub-element of the leadership element of combat power. We have not yet used this as a factor for planning (as of Sep 2002). This would be a value judgment that would have to come from the division leadership.

A major aspect of the COE is that likely no operation will be conducted without the presence of civilians. COBs may be host nation personnel with varying loyalties. They may be from NGOs/international organizations with various agendas. They may be DPs and refugees; or they may be militia or paramilitary personnel from either side able to inflict direct harm, or their actions may lead to friendly casualties through ignorance of friendly plans.

Because of this potential abundance of COB activity, we have hired many local nationals and contracted people to occupy our villages and role-play various personalities that the training brigade would have to deal with. Generally, every brigade, battalion, and company commander that comes through CMTC will have to do a media interview. If the unit deals with the civilians in the proper manner, many of these interviews will be friendly in nature. However, if the unit violates their ROE or treats locals without dignity and respect, these commanders may face a less than friendly press. They may be asked about civilian casualties they caused from artillery effects in a town. The leadership may not even be aware at the time whether or not a village was destroyed by artillery, or whether it was from friendly or enemy fire; often it doesn't matter, as we know that many stories from the international media can be untrue and/or staged to create sympathy.

Example Story Lines




Figure 12

Besides the information operations/media and militia storylines, our scenario has an embedded humanitarian assistance storyline. Figure 12 shows how these storylines are linked. For example, if the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) representative asks for convoy security assistance for a food convoy and the assistance is not provided, the convoy will run but may be ambushed or destroyed, leaving civilians in the brigade's rear area without food. These villagers may then become more susceptible to influence from the VM, possibly providing the VM with information or support on BLUEFOR activities and locations. The villagers may attempt to block certain operations, like logistical package (LOGPAC) runs or they may surround the TOC. The media may show up and ask pointed questions about the destroyed convoy and twist the leadership's answers in press releases seen in after action reviews (AARs). If the BLUEFOR does the right things, they generally suffer fewer consequences.

WHERE WE'RE GOING

As it was in the article two years ago, resourcing continues to be our greatest nemesis. The staff and commanders at CMTC, 7th Army Training Command (7ATC), USAREUR, and the leadership of the training units continue to identify ways to make training better, even when it seems the resources continue to get tighter.

Once again, using the pillars of the CTCs, we have identified where we can make the training better, tougher, and more realistic, better preparing our soldiers for the full spectrum of operations:

The Operations Group Pillar

- Utilize subject matter experts (SMEs) to continue to provide top quality products to the rotational unit. Continue to improve our products.

- Continue to improve the knowledge, skills and attributes of the observer/controllers, through formal O/C training and team internal professional development events, in order to better perform the coach, teach and mentor role to rotational leaders and soldiers.

The Opposing Forces Pillar

- Acquire new equipment, like the OPFOR Surrogate Vehicle, OPFOR Surrogate Tank and OPFOR Surrogate Wheeled Vehicle.
- Acquire a more robust airlift and air attack capability.
- Acquire better dismounted infantry weapons and anti-tank weapons.
- Regularly integrate decoys and countermeasures against rotational units.

The Instrumentation, Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations Pillar

- Acquire unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for exercise/higher control (EXCON/HICON) to provide realistic intelligence feeds to the training brigade.
- Interconnect our instrumentation system (CMTC-IS) with the Digital Battlefield Staff Trainer (DBST) and elements of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), such as All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) and Army field artillery to provide wrap-around situational awareness for Operations Group and the training brigade.
- Improve the CMTC-IS-capability in our MOUT sites.
- Acquire functional personal detection devices (PDDs) to track dismounted elements.




Figure 13

The Training Facilities Pillar (see Figure 13)

- Build larger, more realistic populations in our villages in the training area to better portray the numbers that soldiers encounter on deployments.
- Build reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) capability into exercise design.

The Training Unit Pillar

- TRADOC and the proponent schoolhouses are developing the enabling doctrine to empower the training unit to fight and soundly defeat the OPFOR on the CTC battlefield and be successful on the actual battlefields around the world.

CONCLUSION

The United States is currently at war--we are involved in the war on terrorism and it doesn't look like it will end soon. It seems there is a nearly endless supply of people that don't see things our way and don't want us to live in peace. Therefore, we must fight and win this war. In order to do that we must make the training at CMTC far more rigorous and challenging than anything our soldiers may encounter in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan or in the wadis of Iraq or the jungles of the Philippines.

Charles Darwin said, "It isn't the strongest that survive or even the most intelligent, it is the species that is most adaptable to change." We have seen how adaptable our enemies are. We must stay one step ahead of them. The CSA directed that all the CTCs incorporate the COE into all training and, as you have seen, we have been doing that for many years and continue to train USAREUR's best in the best possible way.

Editor's Note: MAJ Kreg Schnell was previously an intelligence OC at the CMTC in Hohenfels, Germany. He also worked in Operations/Exercise Control before being assigned as the CMTC S2/Threat Fidelity Officer. He is currently the S2 at 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in Vilseck, Germany, preparing for rotation 4B to Kosovo. He can be reached at kreg-schnell@us.army.mil.

Tactical Standing Operating Procedures for Contingency Operations

By Duane L. Smith, Combat Functions Maneuver Analyst,
CMTC, Hohenfels, Germany

This article presents the issues associated with the utilization of tactical standing operating procedures (TSOPs) in contingency operations. It describes a model of a TSOP card system, which was proofed during stabilization force (SFOR) 9, Operation Joint Forge, Task Force Eagle, Bosnia. This TSOP card system could be adapted force-wide for use at multiple echelons in different operating environments.

TSOPs describe how a unit implements applicable doctrine at a tactical level, given its current organization and operating environment. They are not designed to replace or repeat what is already published in U.S. Army doctrine.

Traditional TSOP Problems in Contingency Operations

Many units have TSOPs, but they are not always utilized at home station for a variety of reasons. Some problem areas include:

- They are outdated.
- They repeat the obvious.
- They are excessively lengthy.
- They are too bulky to carry and use in the field.
- Distribution is limited.

TSOP Benefits in Contingency Operations

In contingency operations, the necessity for a traditional TSOP increases while the time and resources available to staff and publish one decreases.



Civil-Military coordination is an example of a task whose standards change from operation to operation and are well suited for TSOP.

TSOPs become increasingly valuable during contingency operations because:

- The necessary flattening of the command and control (C^2) structure due to force caps results in units having to conduct non-standard missions and functions.
- Ad hoc organizations are created to fulfill non-standard missions; or, a unit must be created from several different units from the same or multiple armed services / nations.
- Current doctrine may not be suitable for the current operating environment.
- Rapidly changing conditions in an unstable operating environment necessitates changing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
- Contingency operation deployments are increasingly standardized to a six-month rotation cycle, which contributes to a loss of organizational memory.
- Participation by allied nations integrated into tactical level unit operations exemplifies a lack of common doctrinal background and experiences.

- Transfers of authority (TOA) between rotational units require a handover of procedures in a format that the new rotational unit can easily modify as conditions change.
- Multiple sources of guidance from both U.S. and multinational C² organizations present special challenges.

One solution to address these issues is the TSOP card system, which was used by the 4th Infantry Division for Force XXI Operations. It was designed to be rapidly modified, digitally distributable across multiple platforms, and applicable for multiple echelons, from the individual soldier with his Pre-Combat Inspection TSOP card through division level. These characteristics make this system suitable for rapidly changing contingency operations.

Utilization of the TSOP Card System in Operation Joint Forge

The Civil Military Integration Center (CIMIC) Battalion used a TSOP card system during SFOR 9 from February to September 2000. Many of the typical characteristics of contingency operations were prevalent in this battalion. The unit was composed of soldiers from nine allied nations. Some of the soldiers were from nations that were not NATO members, which restricted the ability to distribute applicable doctrinal manuals. English was the official language, but comprehension levels varied widely among unit members, especially when complicated by an acronym-intensive environment.

The main U.S. contingent was composed of reservists from seven different U.S. Army Reserve civil affairs units. The civil affairs soldiers filled the majority of the C² positions in the battalion. These civil affairs soldiers arrived off the rotational cycle in February 2000 with the Task Force Eagle headquarters conducting the TOA from 10th Mountain Division to 49th Armored Division, Texas National Guard, in April. This change in divisional C² caused many mid-rotation changes in operating procedures for the CIMIC battalion.



The conduct of weapon collection programs requires detailed procedures and they must be disseminated to the lowest level using TSOPs to ensure effectiveness.

The CIMIC battalion was a true ad hoc organization that had existed from 1996 until deactivation in 2001. The size of the unit varied from over three hundred soldiers to under fifty before deactivation. The size and structure of the unit was determined not by doctrine, but by force caps that changed yearly. The CIMIC battalion mission also changed from the initial effort of basic services restoration in the early implementation force (IFOR) years, to facilitating returns of displaced ethnic groups, and finally to monitoring the civil-military operating environment. Few of these missions are described in doctrine, but what is doctrinally described was not applicable to the operating environment in Bosnia.

TSOP Card System

The TSOP card system consists of SOPs that are limited to no more than one page (printed front /back). This facilitates not having to paginate, which allows customizable TSOPs of a manageable size to be created for field use. Soldiers / staffs would only carry the cards that they need at their level. New TSOP cards can be published as they are staffed and inserted as needed in the TSOP

carried in the field. The one page limit forces the staff to focus on brevity. The advantage of this one page format was that a TSOP could be rapidly fielded to the users in the field with rapid changes made as higher headquarters changed procedures due to changing conditions and leadership. TSOP cards are numbered systematically to provide blocks of numbers that can be allocated to different echelons and staff sections. The numbering system that was utilized by the CIMIC battalion is shown below:

1-99	Reports
100-199	Personnel
200-299	Intelligence and Security
300-399	Operations
400-499	Logistics
500-599	Civil-Military Operations
600-699	Communications
700-799	Medical
800-899	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
900-999	Safety

The following examples illustrate section numbering used by the CIMIC battalion:

300-399 Operations Tactical Standing Operating Procedure Cards

300	Mission Order	9 August 2000
301	Searches of Private Residences in MND (N)	22 April 2000
302	Personnel Search Procedures	20 February 2000
303	Vehicle Search Procedures	22 April 2000
304	Rules of Engagement	17 April 2000
305	Mission Pre-Combat Inspection (PCI)	23 June 2000
306	Documentation Team Procedures (TBP)	
307	Bunker and Intruder Drills	11 August 2000
308	Immediate Action Drills (TBP)	
309	Battle Rhythm (TBP)	
310	Convoy Operations (TBP)	
311	M1039 HMMWV Load Plan (TBP)	
312	Vehicle Senior Occupant Responsibilities	11 June 2000

The date that the card is published is placed in the index and directly on the card to designate the latest version. Some of the individual cards were changed three or more times due to the factors mentioned above, as well as due to improvements made to the card. Changes resulted from feedback by individuals and subordinate units after a period of practical use. An initial hard copy in a three ring binder is provided to new soldiers and subordinate units as part of the integration process. Leaders are issued a 9"x 6" binder, while new subordinate units are issued a 12"x 9" binder for the field.

The CIMIC battalion published TSOP cards using a standardized file naming convention and format. The format for the individual cards designated a standard font of Arial 10, and was published in rich text format. This facilitated cross-platform utilization. An example of the naming convention would be 312TSOPCARD.RTF. This naming format facilitated sorting on a shared file. These standards were

important because the CIMIC battalion had computers from three countries that used different software versions that were not compatible.

TSOP cards in the report section are designed to facilitate the transfer of information, both digitally and on paper. The report formats are compatible with higher headquarters. The reports can be digitally completed and electronically transmitted through multiple echelons without ever needing to convert to paper. They are also designed so that they can be used as forms to be filled out in the field when necessary.

Soldiers are then responsible for updating their TSOP binders by posting applicable TSOP cards as they are published. Some soldiers in the battalion kept the TSOP on their accredited Personal Digital Assistants.



Conducting a “go and see” visit is one of the initial steps in the resettlement process. TSOPs for a “go and see” visit should be standardized in the task force area of operations to ensure synchronization of the civil-military effort.

Each TSOP card is staffed and published individually. If there is a non-concurrence issue with one card it will not delay the publishing of other cards. Once a card is approved, it is published electronically through email and posting to the applicable common shared folder. A new index is also published along with each card so that all users are aware of the most current cards.

The publishing of orders are facilitated by the TSOP card system. Units can be tasked to execute various tasks per a designated TSOP. For instance, a civil affairs unit could be tasked to go to a village to conduct a public health assessment IAW TSOP CARD 555 (PUBLIC HEALTH ASSESSMENT). Merely designating which TSOP card to execute also facilitates verbal orders over the radio. The TSOP cards become, in effect, battle drills.

The most important criterion for a TSOP is that it is utilized in the field. The TSOP card system utilized by the CIMIC battalion was well received by soldiers from all nations because they felt involved in the processes of staffing, publishing and proofing the product. This involvement by the soldiers produced practical TSOP cards that were used and understood. All units that are regularly scheduled for contingency operations could benefit by utilizing this TSOP format at home station and during preparatory mission rehearsal exercises. During deployment, the TSOP card system could be modified as required with minimal effort, saving time and streamlining the communications / information process.

Editor's note: Mr. Duane Smith is currently a Combat Functions Maneuver Analyst at CMTC, Hohenfels, Germany. He served as the CIMIC BN S3 during SFOR 9 as a U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs Officer. For further information about this article, he can be contacted at duane.smith@cmtc.7atc.army.mil.